"Western" and "Chinese" values is self-defeating: the only way to get the best out of Western or Chinese values is to see them both as potentially universal, and to put them into dialogue with one another.
The late-January announcement by China's education minister that tightened controls against textbooks' spread of "Western values" is the latest in a series of efforts that many analysts trace to a party directive that was issued in April 2013, known as "Document 9." Among the "false ideological trends" that the document seeks to identify and combat is "Promoting 'universal values' in an attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party's leadership." It goes on to explain that "the goal of espousing 'universal values' is to claim that the West's value system defies time and space, transcends nation and class, and applies to all humanity." 1 The document also specifically targets "Western constitutional democracy," which is presumably an instance of such an allegedly universal value.
According to the document, the goal of those advocating "universal values" is to challenge the Party, its institutions, and its core value of socialism. As China-watchers have noted, one of the underlying motivations for criticism of universal or Western values is a conviction that collapse of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union can be traced to its openness to the institutions and values of Western democracy; the Communist Party of China would like to avoid the same fate. 2 At the same time, some Chinese leaders have been eager to promote China's cultural and political models abroad: for example, this desire for "soft power" clearly motivates China's on-going investment in the nearly 500 Confucius Institutes around the world. So we can conclude that opposition to Western values has two sides: a resistance to change at home, and a desire for change abroad.
One way of reading Chinese rejection of Western values-especially when it is also cast as a denial of "universal values"-is as a kind of cultural relativism. According to such a relativism, the only set of values that applies to us is our values; your group's values apply to you, and to your group alone. As already noted, a cursory look at Chinese history shows the untenability of such a view. Values, and even the very words that we use to discuss them, adapt over time to changing circumstances. Whether our example is Zen Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism, or Chinese Marxism, it is clear that China and Chinese values are not unchanging, monolithic entities, applying only to Chinese. The same goes for Chinese ideas of rights: there has been explicit discussion and debate about rights in Chinese for more than 150 years. 3 The way that Chinese rights discourse has developed relates to new circumstances as much as to pre-existing value orientations, and even these pre-existing
orientations were themselves open-ended enough to allow for considerable flexibility. The story of Chinese rights discourse is one of Chinese thinkers and political actors seeking to solve local problems by developing new solutions that adapt and synthesize language and values from multiple sources, foreign and domestic.
If we reject cultural relativism, is there a way to salvage Chinese resistance to Western values, or must we conclude that it is simply an intellectually bankrupt effort to prop up the status quo? One thing to say is that we should not assume that all of the relevant actors have the same motivations. Perhaps for some, the philosophical and historical implausibility of cultural relativism does not matter, so long as it gets the job done (of defending their current power). Still, worries about Western universalism are actually rather broad-based in China, and if we look closer we can see some good reasons for this. Can Americans who pay attention to the current state of our democracy really
claim that our precise model of political values and institutions is the best possible way to go? For some Chinese, that is, the question is not whether all Western values should be rejected wholesale, but whether the current, pre-packaged set of values and institutions must be accepted en bloc. One intellectual current in China is "new cosmopolitanism," which accepts that we can talk about values cross-culturally, but denies that the West has already found all the answers. This is all the more true, they assert, because it probably makes sense to realize some shared values in different ways in different contexts. There might be broad agreement that sovereignty resides with the people or that polities should rest on basic laws, but the details of how these principles are worked out might legitimately vary, either because there are multiple, equally good models, or because cultural, economic, and other factors may contribute to determining the best way to realize such principles. will also be more difficult to develop new ideas stimulated by encounters with these thinkers. It remains to be seen how wide and deep the restrictions will be. Since the reform period began in 1978, there have regularly been efforts to restrict the practice of "Western" ideas while simultaneously allowing for quite free discussion at an abstract, academic level.
Philosophers talking about the strengths and weaknesses of multi-party democracy has been one thing; advocating multi-party democracy, quite another. There are some signs . 6 Mou was worried about any political system that relies on leadership by individuals who claim to have highly developed moral insight. He had in mind the periodic, terrible excesses of both the traditional Confucian state and the modern Communist one: in both cases, leaders who believed in their own virtue sometimes sought to impose their vision of morality on the realm, with bloody consequences. Mou characterized this as politics being "swallowed" by morality. 7 To be sure, Mou was deeply committed to the importance of striving for sagehood. Among other things, he saw laws and rights themselves as rooted in and emerging from moral struggles. Without morality, there would be no politics. Nonetheless, he recognized that "achieving sagehood is an endless process." 8 Politics (including law) must, therefore, be independent from morality, or else it, too, would 7 be endlessly unfinished and inadequately protective. Mou thus advocated a position that falls between liberal right-based theories and traditional Confucian (or Communist) goodbased theories. Unlike the liberals, Mou held that moral and political value must retain a continuity, lest politics be unmoored from the underlying source of all value, in which case we would have no reason for confidence that the outcomes of our political processes were ultimately aimed at making our lives better. Unlike the Communists and earlier Confucians, though, politics and law must nonetheless stand on their own, independent of morality. In other words, Mou rejected both a direct connection between morality and politics, and a lack of connection. His alternative is an indirect connection. Political value, he says, emerges out of morality, but achieves an independent status because the further development of moral value requires that our moral judgments be self-consciously limited by the autonomous authority of law. believe that the precise values and institutions of present Western countries are somehow the best that humanity can achieve, the "end of history." So we should join in questioning whether the "West's value system defies time and space, transcends nation and class, and applies to all humanity." Still, there are good reasons to think that current Chinese values and institutions-no matter whether we have in mind modern versions of long-lasting traditions like Confucianism, or more recent innovations like Chinese Marxism-also fall short of the best that humanity can achieve. To be sure, "the best that humanity can achieve" may well be plural: that is, there are probably multiple excellent ways to arrange values and institutions, each making different sorts of trade-offs, such that no one perspective is the unique best. What we can be sure of, though, is that none of our existing models is the best that we can do, and we can only improve by being open to wide-ranging critical conversations.
What, then, are concrete steps that reformers can strive to accomplish? Those of us outside of China can begin by noticing when our own peers and institutions take it for granted that the theories and values that have emerged from the Western tradition are the only possible theories and values for us. Too often attention is only paid to foreign ideas in a cultural relativist mode: "if you want to understand them, then you need to study their culture." We need to recognize that "their culture" almost surely has things to teach us about ourselves. This will be good for us, and also models the approach we would like to encourage "them" to take toward "our" culture as well. As for engaged intellectuals within China, two things are crucial. On the one hand, anything that undermines a dichotomous view of the world-us versus them, our values versus theirs, East versus West-is constructive. On the other hand, resisting dichotomies does not mean giving in to the
